INDUSTRIAL AND TRADE POLICIES IN AFRICA: From unproductive rents to learning and accumulation by unknown
 
1 
INDUSTRIAL AND TRADE POLICIES IN AFRICA: 









The resumption of growth in Sub-Saharan Africa though impressive has yet to translate into the 
economic transformation that provides the basis for sustained, rapid growth. The shares of 
manufacturing and formal sector employment have still not recovered to 1980 levels.  
Governance concerns have unduly inhibited emulation of successful trade and related policies 
that have worked elsewhere and can work in Africa.  Many of the liberalization policies not so 
much reduce rents and corruption as divert them into unproductive activities and capital flight. 
Africa can choose selectively from lessons of successes and failures in trade and 
industrialization policies, including in institution building.  A carefully crafted system of 
protection can help to divert rents to productive activities and learning that are the basis for 
sustained growth. The neglect of the need for appropriate protection and finance needs to be 
rectified.   
1. INTRODUCTION 
Transforming the economic structure of Sub-Saharan Africa (hereinafter, simply referred 
to as Africa) is essential for placing the region on a path of sustained, rapid economic growth. 
Arguably, a major failing of the conditionality-intensive “structural adjustment” reforms of the 
1980s and early 1990s in Africa was the neglect of structural change. A focus on getting prices 
right tilted the balance so much in favor of the pursuit of static efficiency in the allocation of 
resources that these so-called “Washington Consensus” reforms neglected incentives for the 
accumulation of resources and learning required for growth and transformation. 
                                                     
1 Sanjay Reddy provided valuable comments. Along with gratitude for his help comes the usual caveat absolving him 
from any responsibility for errors and omissions. 
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That there are potential conflicts between the efficiency and the amount of investment 
and learning is reflected in the many failed polices of excessive and inappropriate protection 
and financial repression in Africa and elsewhere that these reform programs aimed to correct. 
But that conflict and associated moral hazard is also reflected in the sort of protection and 
subsidies that raised the profitability and socialized the risks of investment in many of the most 
successful economies such as the East Asian star performers2. Moreover, liberalization policies 
aimed at correcting price distortions and improving efficiency can be counterproductive by 
diverting rent-seeking activities into even less productive forms, as arguably, they have done in 
many countries, notably in Africa. The question then is not what should receive precedence—
static efficiency or dynamic accumulation/learning—but how to strike the right balance and 
manage the moral hazard.  
This question remains largely unasked even as the worst excesses of those so-called 
“Washington Consensus” reforms have been widely accepted and corrected. It is argued below 
that this stems in part from neglecting a vital prerequisite of private sector led industrialization 
or indeed of a well-functioning market economy, and that trade policies by providing 
appropriate protection can play a vital role in overcoming that shortcoming.  
The implications of these considerations for trade and industrial polices in Africa are the 
focus of this essay. 
2. ADAM SMITH, KARL MARX AND INSTITUTIONS: IMPLICATIONS 
FOR AFRICA  
In his foundational work, Adam Smith ((1776] 2003) spoke of a “previous accumulation” 
of wealth in the economy into the nature and causes of whose wealth he was inquiring. This 
“previous accumulation” predated and preconditioned his analysis: "the accumulation of 
[capital] stock must, in the nature of things, be previous to the division of labor, so labor can be 
more and more subdivided in proportion only as stock is previously more and more 
accumulated"3. Smith then could be said to have explicitly assumed the existence of capitalists, 
i.e. private agents with the ability and willingness to invest. 
Karl Marx followed Smith in making that assumption, translating “previous” as 
“ursprunglich” in German, which his translator rendered back into English as the famous 
                                                     
2 See, for example, World Bank (1993) The East Asian Miracle: Economic Growth and Public Policy (Oxford University 
Press, New York and London). 
3 Smith , Adam([1776] 2003), The Wealth of Nations (Bantam Dell), p. 350. “Stock” is Smith’s term for capital stock. 
Smith elaborates that for example, in a market society, "a weaver cannot apply himself entirely to his peculiar 
business, unless there is beforehand stored up somewhere, either in his own possession or in that of some other 
person, a stock sufficient to maintain him, and to supply him with the materials and tools of his work, till he has not 
only completed but sold his web. This accumulation must, evidently, be previous to his applying his industry for so 
long a time to such a peculiar business" (Smith [1776] 1976). 
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“primitive” accumulation4. By being embellished by Marx and becoming part of the Marxist 
lexicon, “primitive accumulation” presumably acquired the connotations that perhaps led to its 
neglect by economists of other persuasions. Marx (1867) criticized Smith for being ahistorical in 
his explanation but agreed on its essentiality.5  
The fundamental point on which Smith and Marx agree is that the accumulation of 
capital, at any point in time, depends on some already existing capital accumulated earlier to 
invest in the production process. In other words accumulation or investment requires the existence 
of the institution of capitalists or investors.  
Hoff and Stiglitz remark that “in leaving out institutions, history and distributional 
considerations, neo-classical economics leaves out the heart of development economics.”6 But 
even the large recent literature on institutions, including notably those required for the 
existence and proper functioning of markets, ignores the institution implied by “previous” or 
“primitive” accumulation. In other words, it implicitly assumes the existence of economic 
agents who have monies to invest and the ability to do so—capitalists and entrepreneurs. 
Incentives play the role of simply determining their willingness to invest—how much and in 
what—but not their ability to do so.  
But almost by definition, that assumption is not particularly valid for economies at early 
stages of development, like many countries in Sub-Saharan Africa today or many in East and 
South Asia yesterday and elsewhere the day before yesterday. Arriving at later stages of 
development requires economic agents with adequate ability to invest.  
Some of the earlier literature on development with its emphasis on capital accumulation 
as being central to development did pay some attention to the issue of the absence or weakness 
of the institution implied by Smith’s “previous” or Marx’s “primitive” accumulation. Gerald 
Meier, for example, remarks that “Believing that [in] a developing country<the supply of 
entrepreneurship was limited and large structural changes<were needed the first generation of 
development advisers< turned to the government<to promote capital accumulation, utilize 
reserves of labor, <undertake policies of deliberate industrialization <” (emphasis added).7  
                                                     
4 Perelman, Michael (2000) The Invention of Capitalism: Classical Political Economy and the Secret History of Primitive 
Accumulation (Duke University Press) p. 25 
5 In highlighting the historical process, Marx developed a different meaning of primitive accumulation in that he 
linked it to the notion of capital as "class relation" rather than as "stock." Given that "the capital-relation presupposes 
a complete separation between the workers and the ownership of the conditions for the realization of their labour," it 
follows that "the process < which creates the capital-relation can be nothing other than the process which divorces 
the worker from the ownership of the conditions of his own labour." By turning "the social means of subsistence and 
production into capital, and the immediate producers into wage-labourers," this process is therefore the basis of class 
formation. Thus, the "so-called primitive accumulation is nothing else than the historical process of divorcing the 
producer from the means of production", Marx, Karl ([1867] 1976). Capital. Vol. 1. (Penguin, New York) pp. 874-875. 
6 Hoff, K. and Stiglitz, J.E. (2001) “Modern Economic Theory and Development” in Meier, G. and Stiglitz, J. (eds) 
(2001) Frontiers of Development Economics (Oxford University Press, New York), p.390. 
7 Meier, G. (2001) “The Old Generation of Development Economists and the New” in Meier, G. and Stiglitz, J. (eds) 
(2001) Frontiers of Development Economics (Oxford University Press, New York). Also see (See for example, Papanek 
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More often than not, the focus was not so much on the complete absence of capital and 
capitalists as on their inadequacy. Peter Evans notes that “Gerschenkron’s work on<late 
industrializers confronting<technologies with capital requirements in excess of what private 
markets were capable of amassing were forced to rely on the power of the state to 
mobilize<resources<The crux of the problem faced by late developers is that institutions that 
that allow large risks to be spread across a wide network of capital holders do not 
exist.<Hirschman takes up this emphasis on entrepreneurship as the missing ingredient for 
development in much more detail.”8 
However, as noted above, the large literature on the economic role of institutions that 
has emerged rapidly in recent years ignores this dimension and thereby implicitly assumes the 
existence of capitalists/entrepreneurs in adequate measure.9 Thus, Dani Rodrik in answering the 
question of which institutions matter according to the new institutional literature identifies the 
following five pertaining to: (a) property rights, (b) regulatory functions; (c) macroeconomic 
stabilization, (d) social insurance and (e) conflict management, (whilst adding that in his view 
participatory politics is a “meta institution”).10 
Many of the failures of privatization in the transition economies of Eastern Europe and 
the former Soviet Union are attributed to the neglect of this pre-requisite.11 Some of the critics of 
privatization, particularly the Russian privatization of the 1990s, blamed the disaster not only 
on the absence of the “standard” institutions of property rights and contract enforcement that 
figure so prominently in the institutional literature but also, in effect, of capitalists.12 This has 
also been an issue in some of the reform programs of Africa that have also been beset by cases 
of privatization without the requisite institutional underpinnings.  
                                                                                                                                                                           
(1967); Lewis (1971); Little, Scitovsky and Scott (1971), where the issue of creating or strengthening the institution of 
the private sector or capitalists/entrepreneurs is discussed. Elsewhere, advocates of public sector led industrialization 
based their case partly on the weakness of the private sector. 
8 Evans, Peter (2005) “The State as Problem and Solution: Predation, Embedded Autonomy and Structural Change”, 
excerpted in Meier, G. and Rauch, J, (eds) (2005) Leading Issues in Economic Development (Oxford University Press, 
New York and Oxford), p. 543.  
9 For a general overview and critique of this institutional literature, see Mushtaq Khan (2012), “Governance and 
Growth: History, Ideology and Methods of Proof” in Akbar Noman et.al. (eds) op.cit. Also see, in the same volume, 
Thandika Mkandawire (2012) “Institutional Monocropping and Monotasking in Africa.” 
10 Rodrik, Dani (2007), One Economics Many Recipes: Globalization, Institutions and Economic Growth (Princeton 
University Press, Oxford and Princeton), Chapter 5.  
11 The schemes for voucher privatization in some of these countries reflected an attempt to deal with the problem 
posed by the absence of the institution.  
12 See for example, Stiglitz, Joseph (1999), “Quis Custodiet, Ipsos Custodes?”, Challenge, Vol. 42, No.6.. Also see 
Ellerman, David (2003) “On the Russian Privatization Debate”, Challenge, vol. 46, No. 3. And Godoy, S and Stiglitz, J 
(2006) “Growth, Initial Conditions, Law and Speed of Privatization in Transition Countries: 11 Years Later”, NBER 
Working Paper No. 11992. 
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This essay focuses on the implications of the neglect of the institution of capitalist-
entrepreneurs for economic policy in countries at early stages of development. In particular, it is 
concerned with the fact that whilst the past decade or so has witnessed a reversal in the collapse 
of growth in Sub-Saharan Africa that resulted in its “lost quarter-century,” progress in bringing 
about economic transformation of the sort that lays the foundations for sustained growth and 
development remains very limited. Indeed, the share of manufacturing and formal sector 
employment has been generally declining since 1980. 
On average, the share of manufacturing in GDP in Africa fell from 17.5 percent in 1965 
to 12.9 percent in 2009. Relatedly, as Noman and Stiglitz point out “there has been little success 
in exporting manufactures and in attracting foreign direct investment in non-extractive 
activities. Much of the growth of the past decade or so is accounted for by extractive activities in 
non-renewable resources—minerals, metals and above all, oil<”13  
In section 4, we attempt a diagnosis of this phenomenon of deindustrialization or 
“detransformation” of African economies. Much of it is necessarily speculative and more in the 
nature of hypotheses than established results of research. Before that, in the next section, we 
sketch a formal case for infant capitalist protection with minimal mathematics to keep it 
accessible to a wider audience. The final section makes concluding remarks.  
3. THE INFANT CAPITALIST ARGUMENT 
The explicit assumption of Adam Smith and Karl Marx and the implicit one of much 
(all?) recent institutional literature acquires particular salience at early stages of development. 
Formally, this can be characterized, along the lines of Greenwald and Stiglitz,14 as the stage 
when the economy is embarking on development aimed at moving beyond simple agriculture and 
crafts to producing output for which capital and learning are important. 
By definition, “modern” private sector and its capitalists/entrepreneurs are absent at this 
stage and all output emanates from sector A which comprises agriculture and crafts, using only 
labor L (including skills). Sector M, consists of manufacturing (and modern agriculture and 
services) and employs both L and capital, K, which is owned and operated by capitalists, C.  
      ( ) 
    (   )    (   ) { i.e.   ( ) } 
                                                     
13 Noman, Akbar and Stiglitz, Joseph (2012) “Strategies for African Development” in Noman et.al (eds) (2012), Good 
Growth and Governance in Africa: Rethinking Development Strategies, (Oxford University Press, New York and Oxford), 
p.8.  
14 Greenwald, Bruce and Stiglitz, Joseph (2006) “Helping Infant Economies Grow: Foundations of Trade Policies for 
Developing Countries”, American Economic Review, 96 (2): 141-6. 
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With both sectors, total output  
        ( )    (  (   )) 
C either exists on account of primitive/previous accumulation or must be acquired. There is no 
foreign capital or capitalist15.  
The argument that is elaborated below on the acquisition of C and its impact on Y can be 
summarized as: 
    (   ) 
     ( )    (  (  (   )) 
where T stands for tariffs (implicit and explicit) and F for investment finance. With no 
protection and no finance for investment there is no capital accumulation, and hence no 
capitalists and no output in M.  
The relationship is not monotonic, especially with respect to T. Indeed it can be thought 
of as having a threshold below which and another above which there is no relationship between 
C and T (or indeed even a negative one beyond a point as the static efficiency costs outweigh 
dynamic gains) i.e.         
Inevitably at early stages of development, the form of industrial organization is 
characterized by an absence of divorce between ownership and management of capital. The 
capitalist and the entrepreneur are one and the same. So protection stimulates both accumulation 
and entrepreneurship. 
Industrial (or modern sector) entrepreneurship requires capital, which can be 
borrowed—and much of it typically is, especially at early stages of industrialization—or saved 
out of profits.  
Again inevitably, the financial sector is very weak and highly imperfect at the stage we 
are concerned with. Stock and bond markets do not really exist and the availability of long–term 
finance is largely characterized by its absence, especially at rates of interest that would allow 
borrowing for investment that does not yield immediate and very high returns.  
The venerable infant industry argument used by Alexander Hamilton, the first Treasury 
Secretary of the United States, to establish the system of protection under which US 
industrialized16 can be said to have matured some six years with the infant economy argument 
                                                     
15 Alternately, foreign capital/capitalists are very imperfect substitutes for those of the domestic variety or domestic 
capital/capitalists are a different and necessary factor of production. This is essentially a political economy argument 
for the need for local capitalists, where “local” could mean a particular ethno-linguistic group like the “bumiputras” 
in Malaysia.  




of Greenwald and Stiglitz.17 
The essence of these arguments is well known and revolves around learning and 
spillovers. Activities in countries at an early stage of development cannot compete with those 
already well-established in more advanced economies and protection is necessary to help them 
grow, learn and become competitive. That case is extended or adapted in this essay to what we 
refer to as the infant capitalist argument: protection by reducing risks and boosting profits can help 
create and nurture capitalists and enable learning. It does so by facilitating both higher 
accumulation (savings) out of profits and bigger borrowings—as larger profits and reduced 
risks in the protected activities enhance creditworthiness. 
If the capitalist and the entrepreneur are one and the same then capital accumulation 
and entrepreneurship are intertwined at “infancy,” and physical and human capital are 
accumulated jointly. Acquiring physical capital is necessary for learning, which in turn 
facilitates further accumulation.  
Moreover, as argued below, a well-designed structure of protection can also help to 
improve the quality of rents by directing them into industry and entrepreneurship from 
arguably the more wasteful forms that rents have often taken, particularly after trade 
liberalization in many countries, notably in Africa.  
4. INFANT CAPITALISM IN AFRICA: FACTS, SPECULATIONS AND 
HYPOTHESES 
At the dawn of independence, African countries typically can be characterized as 
lacking a class or private sector with the wherewithal to become entrepreneurs in “modern” 
activities. More precisely, to the extent such groups existed, they predominantly comprised 
foreigners or ethnic minorities of relatively recent origin (such as Indians and Lebanese in parts 
of East and West Africa, respectively).18 
Arguably, there was a greater divorce between economic and political elites in Africa 
than anywhere else at the end of colonial rule. This would seem to underlie the emergence of 
the political economy of what Meles Zenawi calls the “predatory state” in Africa.19 At any rate, 
this phenomenon is likely to have provided the basis for an attitude of ambivalence, at best, 
towards the private sector and of resort to public ownership of industries that characterized 
much of Africa, especially in the 1960s and 1970s.  
Whilst some individuals and groups have acquired significant wealth from rent seeking 
                                                     
17 Greenwald, B. and Stiglitz, J.E. (2006)  
18 This is analogous to the situation in Malaysia that led to the New Economic Policy (NEP) launched in 1971 to 
promote the development of Bumiputra (indigenous Malay) businesses/capitalists/private sector. Whilst 
controversial and flawed in some respects, NEP is credited with possibly staving off ethnic conflicts.  




in the post-independence period, that does not serve the purpose that previous or primitive 
accumulation performed in the analysis of Adam Smith and Karl Marx. This reflects the fact 
that typically, incentive regimes provide little or no encouragement for investing in modern, 
transformational sectors in which learning is important or indeed for investing domestically as 
opposed to transferring assets abroad. The sources of wealth have become predominantly 
trading or unproductive rents in a system of incentives that emerged from the economic 
reforms that are commonly referred to as of the Washington Consensus (WC) variety.20 
Typically, rents have taken the form of kickbacks on government contracts, insider wheeling 
and dealing associated with contracts for mineral resources or real estate, privatization or just 
plain theft. Such wealth is also more likely to end up overseas than that emanating from 
investments in modern productive sectors such as manufacturing. 
Trade and financial sector reforms aimed at liberalization have often taken away the 
incentives to invest in domestic production activities. As Azizur Rehman Khan put it, such 
reforms have often taken away bad incentives but replaced them with worse ones.21 There is a 
political economy case to create, protect or nurture infant or toddler indigenous 
capitalists/entrepreneurs in modern, transformational sectors.  
Nicholas Stern argues that the “central policy question here is: How can a country 
develop governance and institutions to support entrepreneurship and well-functioning 
markets?<The policy challenge is thus the promotion of growth through improvements in the 
investment climate: it is about creating conditions so the pie keeps expanding. It is not just a 
question of how to avoid or limit losing slices of the pie as measured by Dupuiy-Harberger 
triangles or even rent-seeking quadrilaterals<.”22 
However, the investment climate and related governance reforms of the type that have 
become the fashion or part of donor conditionalities, have been very imperfect substitutes for 
the sort of trade and industrial policies that attract investments in productive, learning 
activities. The private sector development and associated governance reforms have focused on 
the business climate or ease of doing business such as property rights, contract enforcement, 
rules and regulations, bribes to agents of the state, level playing field and so on.  
Reform programs focused on such governance and institutional reforms, along with 
liberalization and privatization, have more often than not led not so much to reducing rents and 
corruption as to diverting them into unproductive forms. 
                                                     
20 For a more general critique see for example Serra, Narcis and Stiglitz, Joseph (eds) The Washington Consensus 
Reconsidered (OUP, New York and Oxford). In particular, see the paper of Stiglitz, Joseph “The Post-Washington 
Consensus Consensus” in that volume.  
21 Khan. A.R. (2009) chapter 4 in Shahabuddin, Q and Rahman, R.I. (Eds), Development Experience and Emerging 
Challenges: Bangladesh (University Press, Dhaka), especially pages 66-72. 
22 Stern, Nicholas (2003) “Public Policy for Growth and Poverty Reduction” in Arnott, R., Greenwald, B., Kanbur, R., 
and Nalebuff, B.(eds) Economics for an Imperfect World: Essays in Honor of Joseph E. Stiglitz (MIT Press, Cambridge, 
Mass and London) . 
 
9 
They have ignored or neglected incentives that enhance the profitability and reduce the 
risks of investment such as tariff protection, subsidies and access to long-term finance at modest 
interest rates. Such rents acquired via incentives for infant industrialists to invest in infant 
industries can contribute to structural transformation and learning of the type that succeeded so 
spectacularly in East Asia and to varying degrees in South Asia and Latin America.23 
5. LESSONS OF SUCCESS: INFANTS WHO GREW UP 
Much of the literature on policies for developing countries to catch-up revolves around 
the interpretation and lessons of the astounding success in several East Asian countries that has 
been labeled the East Asian miracle.24  
The replicability of the East Asian “model”, especially with regard to trade, industrial 
and financial policies has been much debated essentially on account of its “governance” 
requirements. The “developmental state” that is said to account for the success of East Asian-
style public policy interventions is also said to be well-nigh impossible to emulate. However, 
others such as Ha-Joon Chang, Mushtaq Khan, Noman and Stiglitz, and Meles Zenawi have 
emphasized that governance is not entirely exogenous and argued that the non-replicability of 
East Asian style policies in Africa and elsewhere is much exaggerated.25 
Whatever one’s views on the replicability of the East Asian “developmental state”, the 
feasibility of success with the sort of infant capitalist promotion outlined above is demonstrated 
by relevant examples from other regions, including notably that of Pakistan. An excellent, 
detailed study by Gustav Papanek26 shows how Pakistan created a class of “capitalist-
                                                     
23 See for example, Wade, Robert (1990), Governing the Market (Princeton University Press, Princeton); Amsden, Alice 
(1989), Asia’s Next Giant (OUP, New York); Chang, Ha-Joon (1994) The Political Economy of Industrial Policy, 
(Macmillan, London and Basingstoke); Ocampo, Jose Antonio (2012) The Economic Development of Latin America 
since Independence, (Oxford, Oxford University Press). 
24 The literature is vast. In addition to Amsden (1989) and Wade (1990); see for example, World Bank (1993), The East 
Asian Miracle: Economic Growth and Public Policy (OUP, New York); Chang, Ha-Joon (2006), The East Asian Development 
Experience: The Miracle, The Crisis and the Future, (Zed Books, London and New York); Balassa, Bela “The Lessons of 
East Asian Development: An Overview”, Economic Development and Cultural Change No. 3, April 1988, Supplement; 
Vol. 36; Stiglitz , Joseph (1996),“Some Lessons from the East Asian Miracle”, The World Bank Research Observer, Vol. 11, 
No.2; Stiglitz, J. (2001) "From Miracle to Crisis to Recovery: Lessons from Four Decades of East Asian Experience," in 
Stiglitz. J and Yusuf , S. (eds.), Rethinking the East Asian Miracle, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Also see 
Commission on Growth and Development, The Growth Report: Strategies for Sustained Growth and Inclusive Development 
(World Bank, Washington DC). 
25 See Ha-Joon Chang’s contribution to this volume. Also see the following essays in Noman, A., Botchwey, K,, Stein, 
H., and Stiglitz, J., (eds) (2012) Good Growth and Governance in Africa: Rethinking Development Strategies (OUP, Oxford, 
New York): Mushtaq Khan (2012) “Governance and Growth Challenges for Africa”; Akbar Noman and Joseph 
Stiglitz (2012) “Strategies for African Development” and Meles Zenawi (2012) “Neo-liberal Limitations and the Case 
for a Developmental State”. 
26 Papanek, Gustav(1967) Pakistan’s Development: Social Goals and Private Incentives (Harvard University Press, 
Cambridge, Mass.). See in particular chapters II and III.  
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industrialist-entrepreneurs” pretty much from scratch almost overnight— in not much more 
than five years. Protection played a key role.  
Papanek notes that “Pakistan like other countries in Africa and Asia, not only lacked 
industrial entrepreneurs; it seemed unlikely to develop them in the short run< [but] in fact 
industry grew rapidly, indeed and was largely developed by private entrepreneurs.”27 He 
attributes it at the most proximate level to “annual profits of 50-100 percent on investment” in 
industry28 in the early 1950s (which moreover “helped to restrict both capital flight and 
consumption”).29 By the late 1950s, Papanek reports, such profit rates had fallen to 20-50 
percent. Nonetheless by then enough of a class of industrial entrepreneurs and momentum had 
been created for industrial growth to continue at heady rates.  
Stephen Lewis (1970) and Akbar Noman (1991) also examine how 
industrialists/entrepreneurs/capitalists emerged and blossomed. At the center of a host of 
incentives for investment in manufacturing were rates of protection that provided high and 
assured profits.30 With long-term credit at modest interest rates provided in ample measure by 
two development banks—Pakistan Industrial Credit and Investment Corporation (PICIC) for 
large industries and the Industrial Development Bank of Pakistan (IDBP) for medium sized 
industries—in a context of reasonable macroeconomic stability, investment and accumulation 
boomed.  
 The aforementioned Lewis study was undertaken under the rubric of the highly 
influential OECD research program on trade and industry directed by Little, Scitovsky and 
Scott (LSS) that resulted in their seminal synthesis volume and accompanying country studies.31 
Even as LSS noted and criticized the many pitfalls of the protection regime they pointed out 
that “within our seven countries, only Pakistan had to discover an entrepreneurial class” and as 
the accompanying country study, Lewis (1971) showed, it had done so well within a decade.  
LSS and Lewis agree with Papanek (1967) on this count but they differ from him, in 
emphasizing the static inefficiencies generated by protection. Indeed, LSS go as far as to suggest 
that the rapid industrialization that Pakistan experienced was so inefficient that value-added at 
world prices remained almost negligible. However, this claim of LSS has been subjected to 
several criticisms with the upshot that there is little doubt that these inefficiencies are much 
                                                     
27 Ibid. p.29. 
28Ibid. p.33. 
29 Ibid, p.36. 
30 Lewis, S.R. (1970), Pakistan; Industrialization and Trade Policies (OECD, Paris). Noman, Akbar (1991) “Industrial 
Development and Efficiency in Pakistan: A Revisionist Overview”, The Pakistan Development Review, Vol. 30, No. 4 
(Winter 1991). 
31 Little, I.M.D., Scitovsky, T. and Scott, M.F. (1970) Industry and Trade in Some Developing Countries, (OECD, Paris). 
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exaggerated.32 The system of protection in Pakistan had many excesses, irrationalities, and 
attendant inefficiencies but they were nowhere near as bad as claimed by LSS and Balassa 
(1971)33. Moreover, there was considerable learning with productivity growth and declining 
inefficiencies over time34.  
Indeed, Pakistan’s GDP and industrial growth accelerated to what came to be known as 
East Asian miracle levels before Korea, as did the emergence and growth of manufactured 
exports. Such exports in the mid-1960s exceeded those of Korea by a substantial margin. Korea 
actively sought to learn from Pakistan, including by sending the staff of its economic ministries 
for training there. 
Whatever the inefficiencies of Pakistan’s industrialization, there are, arguably, some 
important lessons about creating or building the institution of capitalists/entrepreneurs, albeit 
whilst avoiding the excesses that vitiated Pakistan’s trade and related policies. The rates and 
variability of protection in Pakistan during the 1950s and 1960s were so high as to leave 
considerable scope for improvements in trade polices while still providing the critical level of 
incentives for the building of a group or class of economic agents with the ability and 
willingness to invest in modern, transformational activities.  
6. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The case for infant capitalist or any other rationale for protection has to be tempered in 
the light of the many failures of interventionist policies for trade and industrialization. But the 
dangers of excessively high and irrational protection can—and should—be avoided. We have 
lessons of failure that were not available or widely appreciated in the 1950s and 1960s and 
perhaps even in the early 1970s.  
The importance of an experimental approach that scales up successes and abandons 
failures quickly is one of the lessons of success. However, learning and implementing the 
lessons of successes and failures well does demand capacities that not all governments have. 
More precisely, the risks and rewards depend on the particular circumstances of a country 
including its governance. But governance capabilities are not given and immutable: the 
question is not only what governance capacities exist at any point in time, but what need to 
exist and what can be built up at what speed. This way of posing the question is all too often 
                                                     
32 See Noman (1981) op. cit. for the compelling reasons for considering the LSS estimates of inefficiency to be grossly 
exaggerated and references to other relevant studies, including Kemal, A.R. (1974) “The Contribution of Pakistan’s 
Large-scale Manufacturing Industries Towards GNP at World Prices”, The Pakistan Development Review, vol. 13. No. 1. 
33 Balassa, B. and Associates (1971) The Structure of Protection in Developing Countries (Johns Hopkins Press, 
Washington). 
34 See, for example, Ahmed, Meekal (1980) Productivity, Prices and Relative Income Shares in Pakistan’s Large-Scale 
Manufacturing (D.Phil. Thesis, Oxford University); and Kemal A.R. (1978), An Analysis of Industrial Efficiency in 
Pakistan, 1959-60-1969-70 (PhD thesis, University of Manchester). 
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ignored or neglected. 
As noted above, the absence of protection of infants also carries risks. Inevitably, there 
are and will be rents and corruption everywhere. The questions are what forms of corruption 
are most intolerable, what forms can be eliminated and how to minimize the negative effects of 
corruption and rents, and channel them into productive activities and learning. A blanket 
attempt to eliminate all corruption and rents, as is the avowed aim of the good governance 
agenda that has become so dominant in the policy discourse, may make the pursuit of the best 
the enemy of the good by a failure to prioritize and by unintended consequences.  
Diverting rent-seeking towards rents that accrue from investing in domestic 
transformational activities such as industry in poor countries can be done by a well-designed 
system of protection. We have a much better appreciation of the need to avoid extremes of level 
and variability of protection, but some variability is needed: broadly speaking moderately nigh 
for simple consumer goods in which low income countries have comparative advantage, lower 
on intermediate goods (none for those that are inputs for exports) and very low or none for 
capital goods.  
Trade policies need to be embedded in a vision, a strategy for economic transformation, 
in industrialization policies (broadly understood to include modern activities in which learning is 
important). Managing the moral hazard emanating from socializing risks of investment and 
accumulation in industry requires ensuring that infants grow and learn. The successful cases 
provide ample evidence of the role of exports and competition in achieving that: protection and 
export promotion can co-exist and competition can be gradually increased. 
Another challenge is to avoid exchange rate overvaluation in resource-rich and heavily 
aid-dependent economies. That is beyond the scope of this paper, except to point out that such 
overvaluation is an argument for protection. Indeed, trade liberalization in such a context can 
exacerbate the adverse effects of currency overvaluation and arguably did so in some African 
economies.  
This is reflected in the de-industrialization or “de-transformation” of African economies 
in their lost quarter-century that has not been reversed even as economic growth has 
accelerated in the past decade or so. Bringing about that reversal, in particular the role that 
trade policies can play in facilitating Adam Smith’s “previous” or Karl Marx’s “primitive” 
accumulation or just plain private sector investment in domestic activities that transform the 
economy is what we have been concerned with. Infant capitalists establishing infant industries 
in infant economies need some protection. They also need long-term finance at reasonable 
interest rates. These considerations were neglected in the so-called Washington Consensus 
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